Summary of ‘Operation Doppelgänger report’

2–3 minutes

By Mark Bollingh – senior Project Manager Privatum

Source

Based on the report “Beyond Operation Doppelgänger: A Capability Assessment of the Social Design Agency” written by JAMES PAMMENT & DAREJAN TSURTSUMIA.

Introduction

In recent years, digital influence operations have become a powerful tool, not only in geopolitical conflicts but also in shaping public perception. One of the most notorious social engineering campaigns was Operation Doppelgänger, launched by Russian actors in 2022, with the primary objective of manipulating global narratives surrounding Ukraine and Western democracies. A newly released report, “Beyond Operation Doppelgänger: A Capability Assessment of the Social Design Agency,” provides an in-depth analysis of the organizations behind this operation and their evolving strategies and treats.

The Doppelgänger Campaign

Operation Doppelgänger was a large-scale disinformation effort, using both well-known and newly developed techniques—including the creation of fake websites resembling legitimate Western news outlets. It also introduced advanced deception tactics designed to evade and mislead established disinformation detection mechanisms.

The initial success of the operation was not solely due to its technical innovations, but also because of its speed and ability to target multiple entities simultaneously. The primary goal was to spread pro-Russian narratives, anti-Ukrainian propaganda, and misinformation aimed at destabilizing Western democracies, often targeting high-profile institutions. The campaign was orchestrated by the Social Design Agency (SDA),  a Kremlin supported entity specializing in global digital influence operations. Currently managed by Sergei Kiriyenko (former prime minister of Russia, currently Kremlin’s domestic policy strategist).

Key Findings

The report, based on over 3,000 leaked documents, provides insights into the internal workings of the SDA, its role in Russia’s information warfare, and its connections within the Kremlin. Some of the key findings include:

  • State-Sanctioned Influence Operations: The SDA operates as part of a state-funded propaganda ecosystem, with access to a broad spectrum of media, including newspapers, TV outlets, and social media channels.
  • Massive Budget & Resources: As a state-funded agency, its budget is estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of euros, exact figures aren’t available.
  • Exploitation of Countermeasures: Due to its use of cutting-edge techniques, attempts to counteract its influence have often backfired, allowing the SDA to strengthen its position in the information war.
  • Strategic Targets: The campaign has focused on high-profile institutions and major global events, ensuring a deep and long-lasting impact.
  • Historical Achievements: While largely forgotten by the public, during the Cold War, the USSR successfully orchestrated several large-scale disinformation campaigns, deeply influencing both social and political landscapes.
  • Mindset Manipulation: Western politicians frequently dismiss the contrasting perspectives held by non-democratic regimes, not out of ignorance, but often out of convenience. These regimes exploit this complacency to ensure long-term influence.

Conclusion

Social engineering has existed since the dawn of civilization and has continually evolved. Digital influence operations are no exception, adapting alongside technological advancements. Understanding the mechanisms behind these operations is crucial for developing effective countermeasures, especially with the rapid development of AI-driven disinformation tactics. Given the growing threats, defence against digital propaganda should be among the top five priorities within the EU. The findings in “Beyond Operation Doppelgänger” offer critical insights into the future of information warfare and the impact of state-sponsored disinformation efforts.